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THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY. By John H. Hallowell.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. Pp. ix, 134. $3.50.
In December, 1954, the Reece Committee on Tax-Exempt Founda-
tions reported that the social sciences in the United States had been cor-
rupted or dragooned by tax-exempt foundations into "an irresponsible
'fact finding mania.' "" Empiricism and experimentation threaten to
bring national disaster. "Empiricism by the very nature of its approach,
ignores moral precepts, principles and established or accepted norms of
behavior, and seeks to base conclusions solely upon what the senses will
take in by means of observation."2 This leads to moral relativism, and
"Moral relativism and the cultural lag theory strike at the very roots of
the average American's traditional values. Promulgation of such un-
verified, psuedo-scientific theories dissolves the belief that religion gives
us certain basic verities upon which we must construct a moral and ethical
life, that certain basic and unalterable principles underlie our system of
government and should be maintained faithfully for the preservation of
our society."'  Experimentation in the natural sciences is good. "Ex-
periment with human beings and their mode of living and being governed
is, however, quite a different matter. If by 'experiment' is meant trying
to find ways in which to make existing institutions better or better work-
ing, that too would be admirable. If by 'experiment' is meant trying to
,find ways in which other political and social institutions could be devised
to supplant those we live by and are satisfied with-then such experiment
is not a desirable use of public funds expended by private individuals
without public accountability.")4  It follows that "some of the larger
foundations have directly supported 'subversion' in the true meaning of
that term, namely, the process of undermining some of our vitally pro-
tective concepts and principles."5
It is a pity that the Committee did not examine the activities of the
Charles R. Walgreen Foundation at the University of Chicago, for there
it would have found comfort. After an initial period of uncertainty, the
Walgreen Foundation has discovered its own political science-or politi-
1. TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONs, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-
Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, H. R. REP. No. 2681, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 18 (1954).
2. Id. at 60.
3. Id. at 88.
4. Id. at 31.
5. Id. at 19.
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cal philosophy-one which rests on metaphysics rather than science, and
which occupies itself with objective values rather than objective behavior.
It is expressed in four volumes of lectures published by the University of
Chicago Press: Philosophy of Democratic Government (1951), by Yves
R. Simon; The New Science of Politics (1952), by Eric Voegelin;
Natural Right and History (1953), by Leo Strauss; and The Moral
Foundation of Democracy (1954), by John H. Hallowell. There are
individual variations, but the four have a common source. This common
source, the basis of the Walgreen political science, is the politics of St.
Thomas Aquinas.
St. Thomas undertook to combine two sorts of truth: what he
understood to be the teaching of Christian revelation and what he under-
stood to be the teaching of reason. In the latter connection he made ex-
tensive use of Aristotle, but necessarily a Christianized Aristotle who
bore little resemblance to the pupil of Plato.6 Even in Aquinas, reason
and revelation were uneasy partners; and with later authors the emphasis
shifted to one or the other element. Jesuit theology, launched by Molina
in the sixteenth century and given definitive political expression by
Suarez in the seventeenth, gave such attention to nature and reason as to
overshadow revelation, and to expose the eighteenth century Jesuits to the
Jansenist accusation of infidelity. The Arminian Grotius went further
and erected a rationalistic system independent not only of revelation but
of deity. The Jansenists, on the other hand, adopted an approach re-
sembling that of Calvin; for them revelation and the supernatural were
virtually exclusive standards of truth and value.
Of our authors, Simon appears to occupy substantially the Jesuit
position; he is certainly the closest to St. Thomas. Strauss seems to
have the general intellectual orientation of Grotius, though, oddly enough,
he does not discuss Grotius in his book. Without rejecting a super-
natural approach to politics, he is satisfied with a naturalistic one, a posi-
tion for which he has been chided by Hallowell. ' Voegelin and Hallowell
talk a great deal about "reason," but they both appear to be in the Jan-
senist tradition. For them the supernatural is the essential and decisive
element in politics. To Voegelin "[t]he truth of man and the truth of
God are inseparably one."' To Hallowell history is "a dialogue between
God and man."'
6. See JAFFA, THOmIsM AND ARISTOTELIANISM1 (1952); Frank, Modern and Ancient
Legal Pragmatism-John Dewey & Co. vs. Aristotle, 25 NOTmE DAME LAw. 205, 460
(1950); Wormuth, Aristotle on Law in EssAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY PRESENTED TO
GEORGE H. SAINE 45 (Konvitz and Murphy ed. 1948).
7. Hallowell, Book Review, 48 Am. POL. Sc. REv. 538 (1954).
8. VOEGELIN, THE NEw SCIENCE OF POLITICS 69 (1952).
9. HALLOWELL, THE MoRAL FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY 95, 100 (1954).
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Our authors agree with the Reece Committee in rejecting empiricism
as an approach to the study of politics. Voegelin makes a violent attack
upon the collection of data without the guidance of "classical and Chris-
tian metaphysics."'" Evidently the central metaphysical principle is so-
teriology, but an edited soteriology. Christian soteriology, says Voegelin,
was in the beginning corrupted by gnosticism; and, in the twelfth century,
it was again corrupted by the idea of progress in the "Everlasting Gos-
per' of Joachim of Flora. Voegelin dates from Joachim all historically
oriented movements that look to the future for the betterment of human
society, and these too he denounces as "Gnosticism": the Protestants, the
Puritans, the Quakers, the Encyclopedists, the socialists, the existential-
ists, and, more generally, "progressivism, positivism, scientism,"" are
the bearers of this vicious tradition. So it is to the Dark Ages that
Voegelin looks for his political principles.
Strauss directs his principal attack against Max Weber, whose name
is among the most prominent in the development of method in the social
sciences. What the name of Weber stands for is, of course, the proposi-
tion that science must confine itself to the study of fact, without pretend-
ing to arrive at ultimate value judgments. The theoretical foundation of
Weber's position is the epistemology of Kant, which is the basis of scientific
method and therefore of positivism. Strauss sidles around the episte-
mological question and attacks Weber on minor grounds. He also raises
a bogeyman: positivism undermines morals and somehow leads to Hitler.
Hallowell has the most detailed roster of purveyors of error. He
does not reach back, as Voegelin, to Joachim, but, beginning with Hel-
vetius in the eighteenth century, he excoriates Robert Owen, Freud,
Pareto, William James, John Dewey, E. R. Bentley, Thurman Arnold,
Harold Lasswell, and Hadley Cantril; he devotes a whole chapter to
T. V. Smith. These men miss true rationalism by excess or defect. For
Hallowell, as for Strauss, the intellectual errors of our time sum up in
positivism. It was the "liberal, positivist jurists" who, "unwittingly it
may be, prepared the way for Lidice and Dachau."' 2 If his book demon-
strated the philosophical unsoundness of positivism, it would certainly
be the most important book of our generation; but, instead of argument,
it offers only dubious propositions about historical causation like that
quoted above.
Strauss, at least, believes in the possibility of excogitating an ethics,
and the whole school attacks positivism as "irrational" because it insists
10. VOEGELIN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 12.
11. Id. at 164.
12. HALLOWELL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 80.
BOOK REVIEWS
that value judgments lie outside the range of demonstrable propositions.
But, apparently, one can be too rational, for Hallowell reproves the
philosophes for their "unbounded confidence in man's ability to be per-
suaded by reason to establish a just social order."'" Hallowell's reason is
"not that emasculated idea of reason which has infected post-Cartesian
philosophy, a reason cut loose from love and debarred from vision, ...
but rather a reason directed toward God as its ultimate goal." It is a
"eseeing passion" which is "the love of God.""'
It follows that-leaving Strauss aside-human society is compre-
hensible only in theological terms. Simon tells us that God has' conferred
spiritual power directly on the Pope; temporal power he has vested in the
people, who transfer it to their rulers. Even in a democracy, however,
the power of decision does not rest with the people: it rests with
"authority." Extremely grave abuses may justify the deposition of
kings, or the coercion of elected officials by public opinion; but the latter
step, like the former, is revolutionary.
This politics necessarily entails an attack upon individualism. Al-
though our authors cite John Locke with approval when his prestige
can be drawn to their cause, in fact they reject his whole system. The
state, says Simon, is not an artificial creation aimed at convenience; it is
the natural condition of man. The "common good," the object of this
natural society, transcends the additive particular goods of the members.
Authority determines this common good, and this is not inconsistent with
liberty; liberty and authority are supplementary and indeed appear to be
almost identical.'" Hallowell tells us that freedom is not "the power to
do what one wants"; it is "service to God and one's fellow-men."'" It
is liberty in this sense that enters into the tables of democratic values
which our authors sometimes supply. It is therefore natural that re-
ligious liberty is nowhere included as one of the democratic values' 7 In
this system God accepts only one kind of service. Did not Aquinas say
that "heretics not only may be excommunicated but also may justly be
put to death" ?"s
13. Id. at 86.
14. Id. at 101.
15. "But with regard to the essential functions of authority, there is no conflict
whatsoever between authority and liberty. The more definitely a community is directed
toward its common good and protected from disunity in its common action, the more"
perfect and the more free it is." SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 140-
141 (1951).
-- -16. HALLoWELL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 129.
17. Hallowell, however, does say that it is undemocratic to deny the right to vote
on account of religious affiliation. Id. at 51.
18. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, Q. xi, ad 3.
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Similarly freedom of speech is confined, as in the Soviet Union, to
a discussion of means. The ends toward which society is directed are not
open to argument. Simon says: "Under fully normal circumstances the
propositions relative to the very ends of social life are above deliberation
in democracy as well as in any other system. Circumstances which make
it necessary to deliver the principles of society, its very soul, to the
hazards of controversy are a fateful threat to any regime, democratic or
not."19 Hallowell quotes this passage with approval," and warns against
the individual conscience that has "'freed' itself from the Christian
revelation and the authority of the church."'"
But suppose the majority of the society has already been corrupted
by bad argument and led astray from the common good. Voegelin boldly
faces up to the question of what is to be done with a democratic society
in which "Gnosticism"-that is individualism, Protestantism, socialism,
existentialism-commands the allegiance of the majority. In this case
it is necessary to jettison democratic procedures in order to save the
common good.
Theoretical debate can be protected by constitutional
guaranties, but it can be established only by the willingness to
use and accept theoretical argument [i.e., theology]. When this
willingness does not exist, a society cannot rely for its function-
ing on argument and persuasion where the truth of human ex-
istence is involved; other means will have to be considered....
. . . a government has the duty to preserve the order as
well as the truth which it represents; when a Gnostic leader
appears and proclaims that God or progress, race or dialectic,
has ordained him to become the existential ruler, a government
is not supposed to betray its trust and to abdicate. And this rule
suffers no exception for governments which operate under a
democratic constitution and a bill of rights. . . . A democratic
government is not supposed to become an accomplice in its
overthrow by letting Gnostic movements grow prodigiously in
the shelter of a muddy interpretation of civil rights; and if
through inadvertence such a movement has grown to the danger
point of capturing existential representation by the famous
"legality" of popular elections, a democratic government is not
supposed to bow to the "will of the people" but to put down the
19. SimoN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 123.
20. HALLOWELL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 122.
21. Id. at 74.
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danger by force and, if necessary, to break the letter of the
constitution in order to save its spirit."2
Unfortunately we are not told directly what course of action is proper
when the government as well as the people is "Gnostic"; but perhaps
Franco showed us the way in Spain.
One can perhaps understand why authors in possession of a precious
truth which they infallibly know are unwilling to risk it on what Voegelin
calls the "loaded dice"2 of free discussion; but what explains their animus
against the empirical method and experimental research? There is good
reason. Science rests upon the Kantian distinction between fact and
value, and this too is fatal to their truth. St. Thomas undertook to
objectify value by asserting that what is is somehow a reflection of what
ought to be; what ought to be, on the other hand, obtains its warrant
from what is. The philosophy of natural law comes down to a simple
semantic confusion; scientific method precludes this confusion.
We may suspect also another motive. Thomistic natural law has
become the philosophy of conservatism because it represents whatever
happens to exist as a mirror of what ought to be. But the seam in this
comforting cloak can easily be rent in either of two directions. A dis-
passionate examination of facts reveals that there is not even an approxi-
mate correspondence between existing facts and any generalized ethical
scheme. And there is an opposite danger. The enthusiastic adoption of
an ethical program explicitly at variance with the existing facts-"Gnos-
ticism" or any other reformist movement-threatens the monopoly of
the existing church, which claims a divine sanction, and the existing
state, which is said to have a natural sanction. The status quo can
tolerate neither an analysis of the past nor a program for the future. It
is for this reason that Simon must insist that "deliberation is about means
and presupposes that the problem of ends has been settled."2 The prob-
lem of ends must not be opened up. This leads to "Gnosticism" or to
positivism. Indeed, it may, according to our authors, lead further.
Simon tells us that "[iin times of social and political convulsions, a skep-
tical thinker, an agnostic intellectual, may reveal that his sense for the
absolute, diverted from being by idealism, rendered acute by culture, and
frustrated by doubt, has grown into a destructive frenzy."2  According,
to Voegelin, "[tiotalitarianism, defined as the existential rule of Gnostic
activists, is the end form of progressive civilization."28  Strauss asserts
22. VoEGELiN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 142-144.
23. Ibid.
24. SImoN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 123.
25. Id. at 92.
26. VOEGErIN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 132.
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that "[t]he contemporary rejection of natural right leads to nihilism-
nay, it is identical with nihilism," and that "[t]he inescapable practical
consequence of nihilism is fanatical obscurantism.""7  Hallowell assimi-
lates the positivist to Plato's tyrant. "When the individual revolts against
tradition and authority, when instinct and desire are exalted above rea-
son, when intellect is subordinated to will, when all desires become lawful
and no standard is left for choosing among them, then at last a master-
passion '. . takes madness for the captain of its guard.. . . " 2
It is unlikely that the reader, who is probably "Gnostic," agnostic,
or positivist, will recognize himself in these portraits. He will not be
conscious of destructive frenzy, nihilism, or fanatical obscurantism. In-
deed, it seems that these proscribed classes have a deeper devotion to
rationality than the authors under review. Each of these authors is con-
fronted by the epistemology of Kant, an obstacle that must be overcome
if their position is to be validated philosophically. Answers to Kant have
been contrived; they have not received general acceptance. But these
authors do not undertake to answer Kant; they never mention him. Their
only reply to the Kantian position is the assertion that it leads to socially
undesirable results. Blasphemy is an offense of indeterminate dimen-
sions, but surely a believer must count it blasphemy to offer as an argu-
ment for God the utilitarian consideration that the idea is a social
convenience.
We must face up to the universe. It is not really profitable to dis-
miss the work of Freud and Bentley and Lasswell because it makes us
uncomfortable, or because it damages the prestige of existing institu-
tions. Nor does facing up to the universe inspire one with megalomania.
Hitler was after all no positivist: on the contrary, he was an absolutist
cut from the very piece of cloth our authors peddle. On the other hand
history's greatest skeptic, Anatole France, drew this compassionate moral
from an unflinching survey of human society: "Let us appoint Irony
and Pity the witnesses and judges of mankind."
Simon opens his book: "Communism and national socialism have
come to resemble each other in so many respects that their historical di-
versity and their lasting opposition arouse wonder."29  We may add a
third to this list; it is what Voegelin has called "the new science of poli-
tics." This authoritarian creed is the enemy of free inquiry, of free
thought, of the individual conscience. It will tolerate discussion only of
27. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 5, 6 (1953).
28. HALLoWELL, op. cit. supra note 9, 't 109-110.
29. SIMoN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1.
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means by those who accept prescribed ends; and these prescribed ends are
determined by a prescribed religion. There is nothing new about this
"science," and its history is a history of ceaseless persecution. One of the
most disquieting things about the time in which we live is this revival of
intellectual obscurantism.
FRANcIs D. WORMUTHt
t Professor of Political Science, University of Utah.
